5-point agenda for new CJN by eminent Nigerian lawyers

For the new chief justice, this challenge is also an opportunity to articulate an agenda for reform that can restore public trust in the judiciary. Such an agenda must address the following:

(a) ensuring merit-based judicial appointments.

(b) addressing the problem of abuse of interim injunctions, ex-parte orders, and conflicting judgements.

(c) enhancing judicial discipline and accountability.

(d) addressing the crisis of political cases, election petitions, and judicialisation of politics; and

(e) reform of the Supreme Court.

The National Judicial Council (NJC), which oversees judicial appointments and is led by the CJN, has been severely criticised for mishandling judicial appointments. In 2020, for instance, it authorised 15 vacancies for the Federal Capital Territory High Court but nominated 34 for appointment.

The NJC has also been accused of retrenching its procedural rules for judicial appointments, thereby undermining merit-based appointments; compromising judicial integrity; and breeding a loss of confidence in the judiciary.

Against this background, it is of the utmost importance that the new CJN commits explicitly to a policy of restoring integrity and merit to judicial appointments through the introduction of transparent processes of advertisement of vacancies, nomination of candidates, interviews, short-listing, and selection.

Rule 3 (3.5) of the judicial code of conduct provides that “a Judicial Officer must avoid the abuse of the power of issuing interim injunctions, ex parte.”

Although the standards governing interim injunctions are very well established in Nigeria, these are often either disregarded or abused without consequences.

Equally, courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction routinely issue conflicting orders that seem almost calculated to damage the institution of the judiciary. It is suggested that:

(a) Priority should be accorded to monitoring and reporting interim or ex parte orders by trial judges. There should also be clear consequences attached to a breach of the Judicial Code of Conduct.

(b) Judicial appraisals should be both quantitative and qualitative. Accordingly, they should proactively address evidence of ethical deficits in the work or output of judges, focusing on adherence to ethical guidelines and the quality of judicial decisions.

(c) There should be clear Practice Directions on the management of jurisdictional overlaps. The structure and scope of such overlaps should be discussed at the All Nigerian Judges  Conference and the Practice Directions should be uniform across all the court systems in the country.

(d) The NJC should establish a central database or easily searchable platform for judges to share information on ongoing cases.

Preserving the dignity and integrity of the judiciary hinges on upholding discipline and accountability which is in turn essential for preserving the institutional authority of the judicial branch. If the judiciary lacks credibility, its authority suffers irredeemably.

Tragically, this eventuality may already be upon us. A recent survey by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) finds the judiciary as the recipient of the highest per capita rates of bribery, ahead of both the Nigeria Police Force and the Nigerian Customs Service.

The damage that this does to the institutional credibility and authority of the judiciary is incalculable. To reverse this, it is suggested that:

(a) Disciplinary processes within the judiciary should be both prompt and decisive and dispositions should be calibrated to be proportionate to the seriousness of the misconduct found.

(b) Reports on disciplinary investigations by the NJC should routinely be transmitted to law enforcement agencies for follow-up.

(c) The CJN should initiate public consultation leading within six months to an announcement of measures designed to address the escalating patterns of judicial corruption as documented by the UNODC-NBS Corruption in Nigeria Report 2024.

Political cases and election petitions now increasingly threaten the foundations of fairness on which the judicial system should be anchored. Of 248 judgements issued by the Supreme Court in the last judicial year, 74 or about 30% were “political cases.”

At a similar occasion only two years ago, his predecessor reported that the court’s portfolio of 269 appeals disposed of included 139 civil appeals, 102 criminal appeals, and 28 “political cases.”

The volume of election petitions has become an adverse charge on the credibility of the judiciary and an intolerable burden on both judges and non-political court users alike.

Underlying this burden is a judiciary that has installed itself as the sole dispenser of electoral mandates, with judges routinely substituting their views for the votes of the people contrary to the considered recommendations of two presidential panels on electoral reform led respectively by former Supreme Court Justice, Bolarinwa Babalakin in 1986 and by former chief justice Mohammed Lawal Uwais in 2008. It is suggested that:

(a) The Chief Justice should initiate reform of the election dispute resolution system to ensure the implementation of the Babalakin Commission and Uwais Panel recommendations concerning the need for Courts to respect and not subvert the will of the people in elections.

(b) The category of “political” cases should be reviewed and court systems should be encouraged to establish Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms for political disputes.

(c) Consideration should be given to utilizing retired senior judges for the administration of election dispute resolution, so that serving judges may be preserved for regular court work.

(d) Election petitions should be disposed of before inauguration. The current practice whereby candidates are sworn in despite pending petitions against them facilitates judicial capture.

For the new chief justice, this challenge is also an opportunity to articulate an agenda for reform that can restore public trust in the judiciary. Such an agenda must address the following:

(a) ensuring merit-based judicial appointments.

(b) addressing the problem of abuse of interim injunctions, ex-parte orders, and conflicting judgements.

(c) enhancing judicial discipline and accountability.

(d) addressing the crisis of political cases, election petitions, and judicialisation of politics; and

(e) reform of the Supreme Court.

The National Judicial Council (NJC), which oversees judicial appointments and is led by the CJN, has been severely criticised for mishandling judicial appointments. In 2020, for instance, it authorised 15 vacancies for the Federal Capital Territory High Court but nominated 34 for appointment.

The NJC has also been accused of retrenching its procedural rules for judicial appointments, thereby undermining merit-based appointments; compromising judicial integrity; and breeding a loss of confidence in the judiciary.

Against this background, it is of the utmost importance that the new CJN commits explicitly to a policy of restoring integrity and merit to judicial appointments through the introduction of transparent processes of advertisement of vacancies, nomination of candidates, interviews, short-listing, and selection.

Rule 3 (3.5) of the judicial code of conduct provides that “a Judicial Officer must avoid the abuse of the power of issuing interim injunctions, ex parte.”

Although the standards governing interim injunctions are very well established in Nigeria, these are often either disregarded or abused without consequences.

Equally, courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction routinely issue conflicting orders that seem almost calculated to damage the institution of the judiciary. It is suggested that:

(a) Priority should be accorded to monitoring and reporting interim or ex parte orders by trial judges. There should also be clear consequences attached to a breach of the Judicial Code of Conduct.

(b) Judicial appraisals should be both quantitative and qualitative. Accordingly, they should proactively address evidence of ethical deficits in the work or output of judges, focusing on adherence to ethical guidelines and the quality of judicial decisions.

(c) There should be clear Practice Directions on the management of jurisdictional overlaps. The structure and scope of such overlaps should be discussed at the All Nigerian Judges  Conference and the Practice Directions should be uniform across all the court systems in the country.

(d) The NJC should establish a central database or easily searchable platform for judges to share information on ongoing cases.

Preserving the dignity and integrity of the judiciary hinges on upholding discipline and accountability which is in turn essential for preserving the institutional authority of the judicial branch. If the judiciary lacks credibility, its authority suffers irredeemably.

Tragically, this eventuality may already be upon us. A recent survey by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) finds the judiciary as the recipient of the highest per capita rates of bribery, ahead of both the Nigeria Police Force and the Nigerian Customs Service.

The damage that this does to the institutional credibility and authority of the judiciary is incalculable. To reverse this, it is suggested that:

(a) Disciplinary processes within the judiciary should be both prompt and decisive and dispositions should be calibrated to be proportionate to the seriousness of the misconduct found.

(b) Reports on disciplinary investigations by the NJC should routinely be transmitted to law enforcement agencies for follow-up.

(c) The CJN should initiate public consultation leading within six months to an announcement of measures designed to address the escalating patterns of judicial corruption as documented by the UNODC-NBS Corruption in Nigeria Report 2024.

Political cases and election petitions now increasingly threaten the foundations of fairness on which the judicial system should be anchored. Of 248 judgements issued by the Supreme Court in the last judicial year, 74 or about 30% were “political cases.”

At a similar occasion only two years ago, his predecessor reported that the court’s portfolio of 269 appeals disposed of included 139 civil appeals, 102 criminal appeals, and 28 “political cases.”

The volume of election petitions has become an adverse charge on the credibility of the judiciary and an intolerable burden on both judges and non-political court users alike.

Underlying this burden is a judiciary that has installed itself as the sole dispenser of electoral mandates, with judges routinely substituting their views for the votes of the people contrary to the considered recommendations of two presidential panels on electoral reform led respectively by former Supreme Court Justice, Bolarinwa Babalakin in 1986 and by former chief justice Mohammed Lawal Uwais in 2008. It is suggested that:

(a) The Chief Justice should initiate reform of the election dispute resolution system to ensure the implementation of the Babalakin Commission and Uwais Panel recommendations concerning the need for Courts to respect and not subvert the will of the people in elections.

(b) The category of “political” cases should be reviewed and court systems should be encouraged to establish Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms for political disputes.

(c) Consideration should be given to utilizing retired senior judges for the administration of election dispute resolution, so that serving judges may be preserved for regular court work.

(d) Election petitions should be disposed of before inauguration. The current practice whereby candidates are sworn in despite pending petitions against them facilitates judicial capture.

For the new chief justice, this challenge is also an opportunity to articulate an agenda for reform that can restore public trust in the judiciary. Such an agenda must address the following:

(a) ensuring merit-based judicial appointments.

(b) addressing the problem of abuse of interim injunctions, ex-parte orders, and conflicting judgements.

(c) enhancing judicial discipline and accountability.

(d) addressing the crisis of political cases, election petitions, and judicialisation of politics; and

(e) reform of the Supreme Court.

The National Judicial Council (NJC), which oversees judicial appointments and is led by the CJN, has been severely criticised for mishandling judicial appointments. In 2020, for instance, it authorised 15 vacancies for the Federal Capital Territory High Court but nominated 34 for appointment.

The NJC has also been accused of retrenching its procedural rules for judicial appointments, thereby undermining merit-based appointments; compromising judicial integrity; and breeding a loss of confidence in the judiciary.

Against this background, it is of the utmost importance that the new CJN commits explicitly to a policy of restoring integrity and merit to judicial appointments through the introduction of transparent processes of advertisement of vacancies, nomination of candidates, interviews, short-listing, and selection.

Rule 3 (3.5) of the judicial code of conduct provides that “a Judicial Officer must avoid the abuse of the power of issuing interim injunctions, ex parte.”

Although the standards governing interim injunctions are very well established in Nigeria, these are often either disregarded or abused without consequences.

Equally, courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction routinely issue conflicting orders that seem almost calculated to damage the institution of the judiciary. It is suggested that:

(a) Priority should be accorded to monitoring and reporting interim or ex parte orders by trial judges. There should also be clear consequences attached to a breach of the Judicial Code of Conduct.

(b) Judicial appraisals should be both quantitative and qualitative. Accordingly, they should proactively address evidence of ethical deficits in the work or output of judges, focusing on adherence to ethical guidelines and the quality of judicial decisions.

(c) There should be clear Practice Directions on the management of jurisdictional overlaps. The structure and scope of such overlaps should be discussed at the All Nigerian Judges  Conference and the Practice Directions should be uniform across all the court systems in the country.

(d) The NJC should establish a central database or easily searchable platform for judges to share information on ongoing cases.

Preserving the dignity and integrity of the judiciary hinges on upholding discipline and accountability which is in turn essential for preserving the institutional authority of the judicial branch. If the judiciary lacks credibility, its authority suffers irredeemably.

Tragically, this eventuality may already be upon us. A recent survey by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) finds the judiciary as the recipient of the highest per capita rates of bribery, ahead of both the Nigeria Police Force and the Nigerian Customs Service.

The damage that this does to the institutional credibility and authority of the judiciary is incalculable. To reverse this, it is suggested that:

(a) Disciplinary processes within the judiciary should be both prompt and decisive and dispositions should be calibrated to be proportionate to the seriousness of the misconduct found.

(b) Reports on disciplinary investigations by the NJC should routinely be transmitted to law enforcement agencies for follow-up.

(c) The CJN should initiate public consultation leading within six months to an announcement of measures designed to address the escalating patterns of judicial corruption as documented by the UNODC-NBS Corruption in Nigeria Report 2024.

Political cases and election petitions now increasingly threaten the foundations of fairness on which the judicial system should be anchored. Of 248 judgements issued by the Supreme Court in the last judicial year, 74 or about 30% were “political cases.”

At a similar occasion only two years ago, his predecessor reported that the court’s portfolio of 269 appeals disposed of included 139 civil appeals, 102 criminal appeals, and 28 “political cases.”

The volume of election petitions has become an adverse charge on the credibility of the judiciary and an intolerable burden on both judges and non-political court users alike.

Underlying this burden is a judiciary that has installed itself as the sole dispenser of electoral mandates, with judges routinely substituting their views for the votes of the people contrary to the considered recommendations of two presidential panels on electoral reform led respectively by former Supreme Court Justice, Bolarinwa Babalakin in 1986 and by former chief justice Mohammed Lawal Uwais in 2008. It is suggested that:

(a) The Chief Justice should initiate reform of the election dispute resolution system to ensure the implementation of the Babalakin Commission and Uwais Panel recommendations concerning the need for Courts to respect and not subvert the will of the people in elections.

(b) The category of “political” cases should be reviewed and court systems should be encouraged to establish Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms for political disputes.

(c) Consideration should be given to utilizing retired senior judges for the administration of election dispute resolution, so that serving judges may be preserved for regular court work.

(d) Election petitions should be disposed of before inauguration. The current practice whereby candidates are sworn in despite pending petitions against them facilitates judicial capture.

For the new chief justice, this challenge is also an opportunity to articulate an agenda for reform that can restore public trust in the judiciary. Such an agenda must address the following:

(a) ensuring merit-based judicial appointments.

(b) addressing the problem of abuse of interim injunctions, ex-parte orders, and conflicting judgements.

(c) enhancing judicial discipline and accountability.

(d) addressing the crisis of political cases, election petitions, and judicialisation of politics; and

(e) reform of the Supreme Court.

The National Judicial Council (NJC), which oversees judicial appointments and is led by the CJN, has been severely criticised for mishandling judicial appointments. In 2020, for instance, it authorised 15 vacancies for the Federal Capital Territory High Court but nominated 34 for appointment.

The NJC has also been accused of retrenching its procedural rules for judicial appointments, thereby undermining merit-based appointments; compromising judicial integrity; and breeding a loss of confidence in the judiciary.

Against this background, it is of the utmost importance that the new CJN commits explicitly to a policy of restoring integrity and merit to judicial appointments through the introduction of transparent processes of advertisement of vacancies, nomination of candidates, interviews, short-listing, and selection.

Rule 3 (3.5) of the judicial code of conduct provides that “a Judicial Officer must avoid the abuse of the power of issuing interim injunctions, ex parte.”

Although the standards governing interim injunctions are very well established in Nigeria, these are often either disregarded or abused without consequences.

Equally, courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction routinely issue conflicting orders that seem almost calculated to damage the institution of the judiciary. It is suggested that:

(a) Priority should be accorded to monitoring and reporting interim or ex parte orders by trial judges. There should also be clear consequences attached to a breach of the Judicial Code of Conduct.

(b) Judicial appraisals should be both quantitative and qualitative. Accordingly, they should proactively address evidence of ethical deficits in the work or output of judges, focusing on adherence to ethical guidelines and the quality of judicial decisions.

(c) There should be clear Practice Directions on the management of jurisdictional overlaps. The structure and scope of such overlaps should be discussed at the All Nigerian Judges  Conference and the Practice Directions should be uniform across all the court systems in the country.

(d) The NJC should establish a central database or easily searchable platform for judges to share information on ongoing cases.

Preserving the dignity and integrity of the judiciary hinges on upholding discipline and accountability which is in turn essential for preserving the institutional authority of the judicial branch. If the judiciary lacks credibility, its authority suffers irredeemably.

Tragically, this eventuality may already be upon us. A recent survey by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) finds the judiciary as the recipient of the highest per capita rates of bribery, ahead of both the Nigeria Police Force and the Nigerian Customs Service.

The damage that this does to the institutional credibility and authority of the judiciary is incalculable. To reverse this, it is suggested that:

(a) Disciplinary processes within the judiciary should be both prompt and decisive and dispositions should be calibrated to be proportionate to the seriousness of the misconduct found.

(b) Reports on disciplinary investigations by the NJC should routinely be transmitted to law enforcement agencies for follow-up.

(c) The CJN should initiate public consultation leading within six months to an announcement of measures designed to address the escalating patterns of judicial corruption as documented by the UNODC-NBS Corruption in Nigeria Report 2024.

Political cases and election petitions now increasingly threaten the foundations of fairness on which the judicial system should be anchored. Of 248 judgements issued by the Supreme Court in the last judicial year, 74 or about 30% were “political cases.”

At a similar occasion only two years ago, his predecessor reported that the court’s portfolio of 269 appeals disposed of included 139 civil appeals, 102 criminal appeals, and 28 “political cases.”

The volume of election petitions has become an adverse charge on the credibility of the judiciary and an intolerable burden on both judges and non-political court users alike.

Underlying this burden is a judiciary that has installed itself as the sole dispenser of electoral mandates, with judges routinely substituting their views for the votes of the people contrary to the considered recommendations of two presidential panels on electoral reform led respectively by former Supreme Court Justice, Bolarinwa Babalakin in 1986 and by former chief justice Mohammed Lawal Uwais in 2008. It is suggested that:

(a) The Chief Justice should initiate reform of the election dispute resolution system to ensure the implementation of the Babalakin Commission and Uwais Panel recommendations concerning the need for Courts to respect and not subvert the will of the people in elections.

(b) The category of “political” cases should be reviewed and court systems should be encouraged to establish Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms for political disputes.

(c) Consideration should be given to utilizing retired senior judges for the administration of election dispute resolution, so that serving judges may be preserved for regular court work.

(d) Election petitions should be disposed of before inauguration. The current practice whereby candidates are sworn in despite pending petitions against them facilitates judicial capture.